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Abstract. This paper studies the inﬂuence of the agents’ information states on
the negotiation equilibrium. This analysis is undertaken by examining a range of
negotiation scenarios in which the amount of information that agents have about
their opponent’s parameters is systematically varied. For each such scenario, we
show that a unique equilibrium exists and we investigate how the information
states of agents inﬂuence the distribution property of the equilibrium solution.
Our study shows the relative impacts of the opponent’s parameters on the nego-
tiation outcome. The results obtained are useful for decision making in situations
where an agent has the option of choosing whom to negotiate with, from among a
set of bargainers, on the basis of its information state. Our analysis also indicates
which of its opponent’s parameters an agent should learn in order to maximize its
utility.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a means for agents to communicate and compromise to reach mutually
beneﬁcial agreements. In such situations, the agents have a common interest in cooper-
ating, but have conﬂicting interests over exactly how to cooperate. Put differently, the
agents can all beneﬁt from reaching agreement on an outcome (from a set of possible
outcomes), but have conﬂicting interests over the set of outcomes. The main problem
that confronts agents in such a situation is to decide how to cooperate - before they ac-
tually cooperate and obtain the fruits of that cooperation. On the one hand, each agent
would like to reach some agreement rather than disagree and not reach any agreement.
But, ontheotherhand,each agent wouldlike to reachan agreement thatis as favourable
to it as possible.
To this end, a number of negotiation models have been developed (see section 5
for more details). These models cover a broad range of agent types and environments.
However to provide a focus for our work, we concentrate on one-to-one negotiations,
with a deadline, betweena buyeranda seller. Inthis typeofcompetitive encounter,each
agent has to make decisions about generating offers and counter-offers in such a way
that their own utility from the ﬁnal agreement is maximized. An essential input to this
decisionmakingprocessisinformation; heredeﬁnedas anyfactorthateffects theabilityofanindividual to makechoices in a given situation.Forinstanceinbargainingbetween
a buyer and a seller, information covers the agent’s own parameters (like its reservation
price or its preferences over possible outcomes), as well as those of its opponent.
Existing models for bargaining with deadlines are of two types: those with com-
plete information and those with incomplete information. In the former setting, agents
know everything about each other’s characteristics, as well as their own [3]. In the lat-
ter setting, agents lack information on some speciﬁc parameters about their opponent.
For instance there could be uncertainty over their discounting factor [13], reservation
price [4], ordeadline[14].Givensuch uncertainty,these models studythe impact onthe
strategic behavior of the agents. Our objective here is not the same. Thus we do not ad-
dress the issue of uncertainty per se, but rather we analyse the impact on the negotiation
outcome of knowing various pieces of information about the opponent’s parameters.
Thus we explore a range of negotiation scenarios by varying the degree of information
an agent has about its opponent.
In particular, we consider three pieces of information to be central to the way that
an agent negotiates in our context. Firstly, the deadline by when the negotiation must
be completed (which may be different for each party). Secondly, the time at which
agreement is reached can effect the agents in different ways [2]. An agent can gain
utility with time and have the incentive to reach a late agreement (within its deadline).
In such a case it is said to be a patient player. Alternatively, the agent can lose utility
with time and have an incentive to reach an early agreement. It is then said to be an
impatient player. Thirdly, the agents’ reservation limits also inﬂuence the outcome. We
therefore study the effect of all these parameters on the equilibrium solution.
Against this background, we analyse the mutual strategic behavior of agents for
varying degrees of information. In each of these situations, we determine equilibrium
strategiesandstudyhowtheinformationstateofagentsinﬂuences thedistributionprop-
erty of the equilibrium outcome; that is, how the gains from trade are divided between
the agents. We say that an agent has more (less) bargaining power than its opponent
if this division is more (less) favourable to it than to its opponent. This analysis has
not previously been undertaken and so this represents the main contribution of this pa-
per. We believe such an analysis is particularly useful for decision making in situations
where an agent has the option of choosing whom to negotiate with, from among a set of
bargainers, on the basis of their information state. Additionally, our results also indicate
which of its opponent’s parameters an agent should learnin order to maximizeits utility
and make it a more effective bargainer.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 de-
tails our negotiation model. Section 3 determines the optimal and equilibrium strategies
by varying the information state of the participating agents. In section 4 we compare
the inﬂuence of the various negotiation parameters on the bargaining power of agents.
Section 5 discusses related work. Finally in section 6 we present the conclusions and
outline the avenues of further research.2 The Negotiation Model
We use an alternating offers protocol for our study. Let
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Otherwise a counter-offer is made.
Since both agents have a deadline, we assume that they use a time dependent func-
tion [1] for generating offers. These tactics vary the price depending on the remaining
negotiation time, modelled as the above deﬁned constant
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￿. In these functions, the
dominant factor used to decide which value to offer next is time
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A wide range of functions can be deﬁned by varying the way in which
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computed (see [1] for more details). However, functions must ensure that
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range, at the beginning it will give the initial constant and when the deadline is reached
it will offer the reservation value. Function
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An inﬁnite number of functions can be deﬁned for different values of
￿. However, two
extreme sets show clearly different patterns of behaviour (see Figure 1).
1. Boulware (B) [12]. For this function,
￿
￿
￿ and the initial offer is maintained till
time is almost exhausted, when the agent concedes up to its reservation value.
2. Conceder (C) [11]. For this function,
￿
￿
￿ and the agent goes to its reservation
value very quickly. When
￿
￿
￿price is increased linearly (L).
The value of a counter-offer depends on the initial price (IP) at which the agent starts
negotiation, the ﬁnal price (FP) beyond which it does not concede,
￿ and
￿
￿. A vector,
V, of these four variables, i.e., V = [IP, FP,
￿
￿,
￿] forms the agent’s strategy. The
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￿
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Fig.1. Negotiation Decision Functions
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the outcome
￿
￿
￿
￿ that results is shown in Figure 2(a). As shown in the ﬁgure, agree-
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ilarly when the NDF in both strategies is replaced with C, agreement is reached at the
same price but near the beginning of negotiation. Figure 2(b) illustrates a negotiation
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￿. As agents have unequal deadlines and both agents use the
￿
function, the strategies do not converge and result in a conﬂict. In general, agents can
avoid conﬂict by using a strategy that offers a mutually acceptable price (i.e., within
￿)
by a mutually acceptable time (the earlier deadline).
Agents’ utilities aredeﬁnedwith thefollowingtwo vonNeumann-Morgensternutil-
ity functions [5] that incorporate the effects of discounting and bargaining costs:
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￿ is a decreasing function of price and
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￿
￿ is an increasing function of price. For
an agent, if
￿
￿
￿ increases with time then the agent gains utility over time and has the
incentive to reach a late agreement. But if
￿
￿
￿ decreases with time then the agent loses
with time and has the incentive to reach an early agreement. Agents are said to have
similar time preferences if both gain on time or both lose on time; otherwise they have
conﬂicting time preferences.
3 Equilibrium Outcomes
Each agent has a reservation limit, a deadline, and a utility function. Thus
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Fig.2. Illustration of an agreement and a negotiation conﬂict
outcome of negotiation depends on all these six parameters. The information state of
an agent is the information it has about the negotiation parameters. An agent’s own
parameters are known to it, but the information it has about the opponent’s parameters
varies. The information state
￿
￿ of an agent
￿ is thus a set of two elements. The ﬁrst
element denoted
￿
￿ is a 3-tuple containing its own parameters. This forms the ﬁxed
part of
￿
￿. The second element, denoted
￿
￿,i sa n
￿-tuple (where
￿ varies between
one and three) containing information about its opponent’s parameters. This forms the
variable part of
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In the following subsections we vary
￿ between one and three. For each value of
￿,
we determine
￿’s optimal strategy
￿
￿ on the basis of
￿
￿ and
￿’s optimal strategy
￿
￿ on
the basis of
￿
￿ where
￿ and
￿ are von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility maximiz-
ers. As described in the previous section, an agent’s strategy is a four element vector
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￿. This is optimal if the four elements satisfy the constraint
of avoiding conﬂict and also result in agreement at the maximum possible utility. We
then prove that this mutual strategic behavior of agents, where both use their respective
optimal strategies, form sequential equilibrium points [10,8].
3.1
￿
￿ contains a single element
We consider three cases where
￿
￿ contains the opponent’s deadline, reservation price
and utility. For the utility of the opponent we do not take the complete function, but
only its attitude towards time. This is because, in practice, it is easier for an agent to
know its opponent’s attitude towards time rather than the entire utility function.b
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1. Deadline. When agents know each others’ deadline, the information states are
￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Optimal strategies. In the absence of
￿
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￿
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￿
￿ (a very low price that lies outside
￿),
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￿
￿
before the earlier deadline. Thus the third element of the strategy becomes
￿
￿ if
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￿
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￿
￿
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￿ and
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Given this, the last element, i.e., the NDF, that
optimises the time of agreement needs to be determined. Figure 3 depicts the nego-
tiation outcome for each of the three NDFs. Note that in this ﬁgure the Boulware
function is an extreme Boulware and the Conceder function is similarly extreme.
￿ denotes the earlier deadline. The dashed lines indicate
￿’s strategy and the solid
lines indicate
￿’s strategy.Note that the actual values of IP and FP in
￿’s strategy are
not known to
￿. IP is taken as some value greater than
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and FP as some value
less than
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Out of the three NDFs we need to determine the one that always
gives
￿ the best possible utility.
￿ can have two possible attitudes towards time. It
can gain utility with time and have the incentive to reach a late agreement or it can
lose utility with time and have the incentive to reach an early agreement. Consider
the case where
￿ gains on time. If
￿ uses the Boulware NDF, then, as seen in Fig-
ure 3(a), the outcome can be
￿
￿,
￿
￿ or
￿
￿ depending on
￿’s strategy. Out of these
three,
￿
￿ results in agreement at the lowest price and highest time. Thus if
￿ uses
the Boulware NDF, it is best for
￿ to also use the Boulware NDF. Similarly if
￿ uses
the Conceder (or Linear) NDF, (see Figures 3(b) and 3(c)) the most favourable
outcome to
￿ is
￿
￿ (or
￿
￿) generated by the Boulware NDF. Thus if
￿ gains on
time, irrespective of
￿’s strategy, it is best for it to always use the B NDF.
￿’s opti-
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where
￿ loses utility on time. Here we consider scenarios where
￿ is small and
￿
is large. So the gain in utility in time from
￿
￿ to
￿
￿ (and
￿
￿ to
￿
￿) outweighs theloss in utility from price. In other words, agents always try to minimize the time
of agreement as long as the price is within the zone of agreement. As shown in
Figures 3(a) 3(b) and 3(c), irrespective of
￿’s strategy,
￿ can minimize the time
of agreement by using the Conceder NDF.
￿’s optimal strategy therefore becomes
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￿
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￿
￿
is some high price outside
￿ and the last element in
￿
￿ is
￿ if
￿ gains on time and
￿ if it loses on time.
Since an agent’s optimal strategy does not depend on its opponent’s strategy, nei-
ther agent has the incentive to deviate from it at any point during negotiation. We
now prove that this mutual strategic behavior of agents forms a sequential equilib-
rium point. As agents do not have information about their opponent’s strategy or
utility, negotiation can be considered as a game G of incomplete information. A
strategy proﬁle and belief system pair is a sequential equilibrium of an extensive
game if it is sequential rational and consistent [8]. A system of beliefs
  in G is a
speciﬁcation of a probability
!
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for each decision node
! in G such that
￿
￿
￿I
 
￿
!
￿
￿
￿
for all information sets I. In other words,
  represents the agent’s beliefs about the
history of negotiation. The player’s strategies satisfy sequential rationality if for
each information set of each player
￿, the strategy of player
￿ is a best response
to the other player’s strategies, given
￿’s beliefs in that information set. The re-
quirement for
  to be consistent with the strategy proﬁle is as follows. Even at an
information set that is not reached if all players adhere to their strategies, it is re-
quiredthata player’s beliefbederivedfromsomestrategyproﬁleusingBayes’rule.
Proposition 1. There exists sequential equilibrium of G at the point
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Proof. The ﬁrst three levels of the extensive form for this game (G) are shown
in Figure 4. At node 1, one of the players, say
￿, starts negotiation using its optimal
strategy
￿
￿. After the ﬁrst offer, play reaches node 2. At this level, it is player
￿’s
turn to make a decision. I
￿ becomes the information set for
￿ since it is unaware of
the strategy used by
￿ and hence does not know which of the three nodes 2, 3 or 4,
play has reached. However, irrespective of exactly which node play reaches at this
level (i.e., irrespective of
￿’s belief about the history of negotiation), the dominant
strategy for
￿ is
￿
￿. Play now reaches node 5 (since both agents use B) at which
￿ makes a move. At this point
￿ does not know exactly which node the play is at,
but it knows that its information set I
￿ is reached with probability 1 (probability of
reaching other decision nodes at this level is 0). The dominant strategy for
￿ at this
information set (and at all others) is
￿
￿. Thus at every information set at which it is
￿’s turn to move, its optimal strategy is
￿
￿ and at every information set at which it
is
￿’s turn to make a move, its optimal strategy is
￿
￿. The strategy proﬁle
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
therefore satisﬁes the requirements for sequential rationality. Furthermore, at every
information set the optimal strategies are also dominant strategies. This makes the
strategy proﬁle
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ a sequential equilibrium point irrespective of the agents’Buyer
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Fig.4. Extensive form of the negotiation game
beliefs about the history of negotiation.
￿
Corollary 1. The equilibrium at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is unique.
This is a direct consequence of the above proof. As the optimal strategies for both
agents are dominant strategies at each of their information sets, there does not
exist any other equilibrium (neither a pure nor a mixed strategy) where an agent
uses a strategy other than its optimal strategy. The equilibrium solution is therefore
unique.
￿
The equilibrium outcomes for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ in the four possible negotiation scenar-
ios are listed in table 1.
2. Reservation price
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￿
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￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿
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The third element is B if
￿ is patient and C if it is impatient. Similarly the optimal
strategy for
￿ becomes
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￿
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￿
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￿
￿. The proof of proposition 1
can also be used to show that a unique equilibrium exists at
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￿
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￿ in this case.
The equilibrium outcomes for
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￿
"
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￿
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￿ are also listed in table 1.
3. Attitude towards time
￿
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￿. Here
￿
￿
￿
￿
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#
￿
￿ and agents know
whether the opponent’s utility increases or decreases with time (G or L) but not
the complete utility function. In the absence of any other information about the
opponent, the strategies available to the agents are
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
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￿
￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. However as illustrated in Figure 2(b), these
strategies do not ensure agreement and can result in conﬂict.￿
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Table 1. Equilibrium outcomes and bargaining power for different
￿
￿s. G indicates that the agent
gains on time and L that it loses on time.
￿
￿ denotes the beginning of negotiation,
￿ the earlier
deadline,
￿ denotes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿ indicates the outcome if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
3.2
￿
￿ contains two elements
We now consider the effect of different parameter pairs on the negotiation equilibrium.
1. Deadline, Reservation price. Here
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. With
this information available to both agents, the optimal strategies can be determined
using backward induction as follows.Consider the case where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ as shown
in Figure 5. The thick line denotes
￿’s strategy and the dashed lines denote
￿’s strat-
egy.No matterwhichstrategy
￿ uses, it is boundto reach
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ by
￿
￿ since it would
have to quit if agreement is not reached by
￿
￿.
￿ can use this information to maxi-
mize its utility by never offering a price more than
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ prior to
￿
￿.I f
￿ gains on
time, its optimalstrategy,
￿
￿,i s
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ sinceB has theproperty ofnot
reaching
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ before
￿
￿. On the other hand if
￿ loses on time, it tries to reach an
early agreement and
￿
￿ becomes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The optimal strategy for
￿,
￿
￿, will be
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if it gains utility with time or
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
if it loses utility with time. In the other case where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿ will maxi-
mize its utility by never offering a price lower than
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ before
￿
￿. Thus
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ifitgainsontime,and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ifitlosesontime.
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￿
￿
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￿
￿
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time. Here again the proof of proposition 1 can be used to show the existence of aPrice
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Fig.5. Possible seller strategies
unique equilibrium at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The equilibrium outcomes for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
￿
are listed in table 1.
2. Reservationprice,Attitudetowardstime.Here
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
￿
￿.
An agent’s optimal strategy when
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
￿ is independent of its opponent’s
strategy. Adding the opponent’s attitude towards time to
￿
￿ therefore gives the
same equilibrium strategies and outcomes as for
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
￿.
3. Deadline, Attitude towards time. As in the previous case, this gives the same equi-
librium outcomes as for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
3.3
￿
￿ contains three elements
Here
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
￿
￿. The optimal strategies of
agentsfor
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
￿donotdependontheopponent’sattitudetowards time(see
section for
￿
￿
￿ ). This gives the same equilibrium outcomes as for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
￿
￿.
But
#
￿
￿ can be used to infer the opponent’s NDF. For
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿we showed
that a patient player uses the Boulware NDF and an impatient player uses the Conceder
NDF. This makes
￿ a game of perfect information and both agents can pre-compute
the negotiation outcome with the available information. The outcome is the same as the
one obtained without
#
￿ (see table 1) but its inclusion eliminates the need for agents to
go through the process of negotiation to arrive at it.
4 Agents’ Bargaining Power
The distribution property of a negotiation outcome relates to the issue of how the gains
from trade are divided between the players. The price
￿
￿ and time
￿
￿ of the equilibrium
agreement reﬂects the relationship between the agents’ bargaining powers. We say thatan agent has more (less) bargaining power than its opponent if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is more (less)
in its favour than its opponent. Assume that the price-surplus is split between
￿ and
￿ in
the ratio
!
￿
$. The agent
￿ is said to have more (less) power overprice if
!
￿
$
￿
!
￿
$
￿.
In other words, an agent’s bargaining power is determined on the basis of its share of
the price-surplus. Regarding the time of agreement, if
￿ prefers an early agreement but
￿ prefers a late agreement and the actual time of agreement is the earlier deadline, then
￿ is said to have more bargaining power over time. Note that we do not use the agents’
utility functions to determine their bargaining power since these functions can be sub-
jective. We now study the inﬂuence of the agents’ information about their opponent’s
parameters on the bargaining power. These results are summarised in table 1.
1. Inﬂuence of opponent’s deadline. When agents know each others’ deadline, the pa-
tient agent has equalormore powerthanits opponentoverbothpriceandtime.This
can be explained as follows. Consider ﬁrst the case where agents have similar time
preferences. The price-surplus is divided equally between the agents (see previous
section) giving them equal power over price. When both gain on time, agreement
is reached at the earlier deadline and when both lose on time, agreement is reached
towards the beginning of negotiation. In other words, the time of agreement is as
favourable as possible to both agents giving them equal power over time. When
agents have conﬂicting time preferences, the entire price-surplus goes to the pa-
tient agent and agreement is reached at the earlier deadline. This happens because
although the impatient player attempts to reach an early agreement by using the
Conceder NDF, its opponent’s strategy delays agreement till the earlier deadline.
Thus both
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ are in favour of the patient agent giving it more power than its
opponent.
2. Inﬂuence of opponent’s reservation-price. When agents know each others’ reser-
vation price, the patient agent has either more or less power than its opponent and
the impatient agent has equal or less power than its opponent over price. With re-
spect to time, the patient agent has equal or less power than its opponent and the
impatient agent has equal or more power than its opponent. This can be explained
as follows. Consider similar time preferences ﬁrst. When both gain on time, the
price-surplus goes to the agent with the longer deadline giving it more power than
its opponent. When both lose on time, the price-surplus is divided equally between
the agents giving them equal power over
￿
￿. Agreement is reached at the earlier
deadline when both gain on time and at the beginning of negotiation when both
lose on time. Thus
￿
￿ is as favourable as possible to both agents giving them equal
power. When agents have conﬂicting time preferences, the price-surplus goes to
the patient agent and agreement is reached towards the beginning of negotiation.
This happens because the initial offers are
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿. The time
of agreement is in favour of the impatient agent. Thus the patient agent has more
power over
￿
￿ but the impatient agent has more power over
￿
￿.
3. Inﬂuence of deadline and reservation-price. When agents know each others’ dead-
line and reservation price, the agent with the longer deadline always has more
power than its opponent over price. An agent’s power over time depends on its
attitude towards time. The patient agent has equal or more power than its oppo-
nent over time. This parameter combination always gives the entire price-surplusto the agent with the longer deadline giving it more power over price. Agreement
is reached at the earlier deadline when at least one agent gains on time and at the
beginning of negotiation when both lose on time. Thus agents have equal power in
the case of like time preferences, but the patient agent gets more power in the case
of conﬂicting time preferences.
4. Inﬂuence of opponent’s attitude towards time. Adding this information when there
is no existing information, or when there is information on any other single pa-
rameter (or a parameter pair) doesn’t alter the equilibrium strategies or the out-
come. However adding this information in addition to both deadline and reserva-
tion price eliminates the need for negotiation between agents as the solution can be
pre-computed.
We now illustrate how the results from table 1 can be used when
￿ has the option of
choosing between two sellers,
￿
￿ and
￿
￿, on the basis of its information state. Consider
the case where agents know each others’ deadlines and reservation prices. Assume that
￿ gains on time and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. The equilibrium outcome is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
if
￿ negotiates with
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿ negotiates with
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, then
￿ has more bargaining power over
￿
￿ than it has over
￿
￿, i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and it therefore chooses
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿ chooses
￿
￿.
Consider another case where
￿ and
￿
￿ know each other’s deadlines and
￿ and
￿
￿
know each other’s deadlines and reservation prices.
￿’s equilibrium outcome with
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿ gains on time and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿ loses on time. On the other
hand, the equilibrium outcome between
￿ and
￿
￿ is always
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿ gets the
entire price-surplus. From
￿
￿,
￿ gets only half the price-surplus if
￿
￿ gains on time. Also
since
￿ is a patient player, it prefers
￿
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿. Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
In terms of ﬁnding which parameter an agent should learn about its opponent, con-
sider the example of an impatient agent. In this case, both
￿ and
￿ can be better off if
they learn
"
￿
￿
￿, rather than
￿
￿
￿ or
#
￿
￿ (see table 1). Thus out of the three, the most cru-
cial piece of information for an impatient agent to learn is the opponent’s reservation
price
"
￿
￿
￿.
5 Related Work
A number of strategic models have been developed to explain the deadline effect on the
bargainingoutcome.Thesecanbeseparatedintomodelswithcompleteinformationand
those with incomplete information. The recent ones among the complete information
modelsinclude [3]and [9].FershtmanandSeidmannmodel deadline effects in amulti-
periodsequential bargaining model in which the player who will propose in each period
is chosen by a lottery. Equilibrium behavior in this model depends on the discount
factor; if it is low, agreement is reached in the ﬁrst period, but if it is high enough,
then the game will end in the last period with the proposer receiving all the surplus.
Ma and Manove’s model is also one of complete information but with imperfect player
control over the timing of the offers. Agreements in this model tend to be made near
the deadline and the division of surplus is close to an even split. In contrast to this,in our model, when there is complete information, the time of agreement is
￿
￿ when
both agents are impatient and
￿ otherwise. Note that the time of agreement does not
depend on the actual discounting factor. The entire price-surplus goes to the agent with
the longer deadline.
Turning now to the incomplete information models: [7,6] is a study of the strate-
gic behaviour of agents when there is incomplete information about each other’s utility
functions. [13] models uncertainty over the player’s discounting factors. [4] analy-
ses bargaining in which reservation prices are uncertain, [14] considers uncertainty
over agent deadlines and [2] addresses uncertainty over both deadlines and reservation
prices. These existing models study the strategic behavior of agents by considering a
particular scenario in which there is uncertainty over a chosen negotiation parameter.
Our aim, on the other hand, is to determine the relative inﬂuences of such parameters
on the negotiation outcome for a model based on negotiation decision functions. We
therefore determine equilibrium outcomes for a range of scenarios by varying the in-
formation state of agents. On the basis of equilibrium agreements, we determine their
bargaining power.
6 Conclusions
In this paperwe analysedthe process ofbilateral negotiation by varying the information
state of agents. We determined equilibrium points for a number of scenarios and anal-
ysed the relative inﬂuences of negotiation parameters on the equilibrium outcome. Our
studyrevealsthat foranynegotiation scenario, thereare two possiblevalues forthetime
of the equilibrium agreement: the beginning of negotiation or the earlier deadline. The
price of the equilibrium agreement also has only two possible values. Either the entire
price-surplus goes to a single agent or both agents get an equal share of it. On the basis
of equilibrium agreements we determined the relationship between agents’ bargaining
powers.
In our present study, the information of both agents was symmetric, i.e., both agents
had information on the same parameter(s) about each other. In future we will extend
our analysis to determine negotiation equilibria where agents have unequal amounts
and types of information. For instance, the buyer has information about the seller’s
deadline or its reservation price but the seller has no information about the buyer.
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